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Abstract. We study the heterogeneous effects of online video platforms on the sales
volume and sales distribution of recorded music. Identification comes from two natural
experiments in Germany. In 2009, virtually all music videos were blocked from YouTube
as a result of a legal dispute. In 2013, the dedicated platform Vevo entered the market,
making videos of a large number of artists available overnight. Our estimates suggest that
restricting (enabling) access to online videos decreases (increases) recorded music sales on
average by about 5%–10%.We show that the effect operates independently of the nature of
video content, suggesting that user-generated content is as effective as official content.
Moreover, we highlight heterogeneity in this effect: online music videos disproportionally
benefit sales of new artists and sales of mainstream music.
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1. Introduction
Digitization has brought important changes to the
recorded music industry. Thanks to a substantial
decline in the fixed cost of production, distribution, and
promotion, the number of new songs on the market has
tripled (Aguiar andWaldfogel 2016, 2018a). However,
the precise way that digital distribution and pro-
motion affect artists’ revenue streams (with impli-
cations for incentives to invest in new content in the
long run) is not fully understood. We compare open
and closed content distribution platforms in their ef-
fects on revenues in other distribution channels and
highlight important heterogeneity in those effects.
Digital platforms distributing content differ in the
amount of control rights holders have over available
content and the corresponding revenue model. The
spectrum ranges from unlicensed platforms, such as
(the original) Napster or Megaupload, to licensed open
platforms, such as YouTube and SoundCloud that
allow anyone to upload content, to licensed closed
platforms, such as iTunes and Spotify, where only the
rights holders themselves can contribute.
By definition, unlicensed platforms do not com-
pensate rights holders. Indeed, the relatively large
literature on digital piracy suggests that unlicensed
consumption mostly substitutes for licensed con-
sumption.1 Licensed platforms typically pay some
share of sales, advertising revenues, or per-use roy-
alties. An emerging literature has started to look
into closed platform streaming services and typically
finds that services such as Spotify substitute for pi-
racy and digital ownership but leave aggregate rev-
enues largely unchanged (e.g., Thomes 2013, Nguyen
et al. 2014, Wlömert and Papies 2016, Aguiar and
Waldfogel 2018b, Datta et al. 2018). Surprisingly lit-
tle is known about licensed open platforms. They are
particularly interesting because they create a market
for derivative works. Rights holders are compensated
for third-party use of their work without requiring in-
dividual licensing contracts. For example, on YouTube,
where user-generated content (UGC) comprises the
majority of available content (Liikkanen and Salovaara
2015), rights holders can get a share of advertising
revenues generated from third-party content.
We study how the open platform YouTube affects
sales of recorded music and compare its effect with
that of Vevo, a closed platform. We then investigate
how availability on YouTube affects the type and
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variety of music consumers demand on other chan-
nels (Piolatto and Schuett 2012, Datta et al. 2018). As
with many other digital platforms, YouTube offers
tools that allow for search and social interaction and
provides up-to-date lists of the most popular videos
and automated recommendations to help consumers
comb through the vast amount of content available on
the platform (Zhou et al. 2016), although its role in
shaping the popularity distribution is not clear ex ante
(Fleder and Hosanagar 2009, Tucker and Zhang 2011,
Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2012b, Susarla
et al. 2012, Godinho de Matos et al. 2016).
A unique setting in the German market helps us
establish a causal link between YouTube availability
and other consumption channels for recorded mu-
sic. As a result of a royalty dispute between YouTube
and the de facto monopolist royalty collection soci-
ety that represents artists and publishers (not re-
cord labels), the Society for Musical Performing and
Mechanical Reproduction Rights (Gesellschaft für
musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Ver-
vielfältigungsrechte (GEMA)), YouTube blocked ac-
cess to almost all videos containingmusic in Germany
on April 1, 2009.2 For example, 85% of the 689 music
videos in the list of the 1,000 most viewed videos
globally were blocked in Germany, whereas the same
content remained accessible in a vastmajority of other
countries. For instance, 99% of those videos could be
accessed in the United States.3 This standoff persisted
until a consortium of record labels negotiated its own
deal with GEMA and launched the dedicated plat-
form Vevo on October, 1, 2013, which in most other
countries is simply a channel on YouTube.
We use scanner data on the weekly numbers of
units sold on physical media and as digital down-
loads for the 1,000 highest-grossing songs on the
German market and match them with rich meta-
information at the release and artist levels. For 2013,
we also observe the weekly number of (free and
paid) streams per song. For each song in our data, we
collect information onwhether a corresponding video
was available on YouTube (or Vevo). We estimate a
difference-in-differences model to compare sales of
songs with videos with sales of songs without videos
four weeks before and four weeks after the natural
experiment(s) we observe.
Our results provide strong evidence that YouTube is
complementary to other licensed consumption chan-
nels, at least in the short run. Across a variety of dif-
ferent specifications, our most conservative estimates
suggest that removing access to music videos on
YouTube reduces total weekly sales by approximately
6% on average. This result is robust to a number of
falsification exercises, including placebo tests and
data fromAustria, a country that shares language and
cultural history with Germany but was not affected
by the blocking on YouTube. We show that the size of
our estimated effect does not vary across songs that
have a higher share of user-generated videos on
YouTube, suggesting that UGC has a complementary
effect very similar to that of official content. Strik-
ingly, weekly sales and streams increase by a similar
amount when Vevo, a closed platform without UGC,
enters the market four years later. We do not find
evidence that suggests that the complementary effect
is moderated by overall popularity as measured in
sales. We then study heterogeneity across songs and
find that YouTube disproportionately benefits sales
of new artists and mass-market artists (mainstream
music). Finally, we show that the experiments we
study in this paper affect the composition of not only
sales/streams of songs but also aggregated sales/
streams of songs. However, our data preclude us
from studying the effect of online music videos on
bundled sales of songs, for example, through albums.
We discuss these limitations in the context of the
related literature.
By studying the (un)availability of a licensed open
platform for music consumption and its heterogeneous
effect on demand on other consumption channels, we
make several contributions. Specifically, we emphasize
the effect of digital distribution platforms on product
discovery rather than just their substitution of paid
channels. Demonstrating that mainstream artists and
new artists benefit disproportionally from digital dis-
tribution platforms also adds to the literature on the
effect of digitization on the sales distribution (“long
tail”; Brynjolfsson et al. 2010, 2011). Furthermore,
our results may be informative in the context of
cultural trade policy (Hervas-Drane and Noam 2017)
and the debate on the reform of the compulsory li-
censing rules of interactive digital services (Lenard
and White 2015).
2. Related Work and Research Framework
2.1. Channel Competition: Displacement
or Promotion?
A growing literature seems to have established that
unlicensed consumption (digital piracy) harms sales
of licensed products (e.g., Bhattacharjee et al. 2007,
Adermon and Liang 2014, Danaher et al. 2014), with
substantial variation in estimated displacement rates
(Hui and Png 2003; Rob and Waldfogel 2006, 2007;
Zentner 2006; Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 2007;
Liebowitz 2016). Recent empirical evidence on digi-
tal piracy (Peukert et al. 2017) supports the theoret-
ical work, arguing that unpaid consumption can in-
crease sales in licensed channels because of demand
externalities (Takeyama 1994) or because consumers
can sample (vertical or horizontal) product quality a
zero marginal cost (Peitz and Waelbroeck 2006). The
growing adoption of licensed services, technological
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advances, and business model innovations has changed
how and at what cost consumers access digital goods.
Theoretically, (low-priced) licensed online offerings
can combat piracy (Thomes 2013), which is empiri-
cally supported in several settings (Danaher et al.
2010, Papies et al. 2011, Poort and Weda 2015,
Aguiar and Waldfogel 2018b). For example, Zhang
(2018) shows that making licensed content more us-
able (by removing digital rights management restric-
tions) increases sales of that content. Studies show
that streaming services are associated with lower
sales in conventional channels (Hiller 2016, Wlömert
and Papies 2016, Aguiar and Waldfogel 2018b, Datta
et al. 2018) but lead to higher per-capita consump-
tion (Datta et al. 2018), so the aggregate revenues of
the music industry remain more or less unchanged
(Wlömert and Papies 2016, Aguiar and Waldfogel
2018b). However, some studies also suggest com-
plementary effects of streaming. For example, Nguyen
et al. (2014) find that streaming services do not affect
physical purchases but increase attendance at live
concerts. Online video in particular has been shown to
indirectly increase sales of complementary products
in the context of fashion retail (Kumar and Tan 2015).
For music, however, there may be a more direct effect
on sales. In October 2008, YouTube rolled out click-
to-buy links to iTunes and Amazon Next to music
videos. Rights holders can choose to add such links
to their own uploads and to user-generated videos
for which the rights holder is identified through
YouTube’s Content ID system (see YouTube 2008).
Given the mixed prior evidence and the specific in-
stitutional details, however, the average effect of
YouTube on sales of individual songs remains an em-
pirical question.4
2.2. User-Generated Content
YouTube is an open licensed platform, meaning that
anyone can provide content to the platform, and the
platform has taken steps for rights holders to be
compensated for the use of their content. Therefore,
YouTube content linked to a particular song is usually
a combination of official videos and UGC, which may
affect its impact on recorded music sales.
YouTube is an immensely popular music plat-
form. More than 80% of YouTube visitors use it for
music (International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry 2016), and video-based streaming accoun-
ted for more than 50% of the 317.3 billion music
streams in the United States in 2015.5 Approximately
30% of YouTube videos (and 40% of total views) are
music videos (Liikkanen and Salovaara 2015). You-
Tube is not heavily invested in the creation of its own
music content but provides financial incentives to
third parties to upload content (Tang et al. 2012).
Consistent with evidence that ad revenue sharing
and content commercialization shift incentives to-
ward creating more mass-oriented content (Sun and
Zhu 2013), the introduction of the so-called partner
program in 2007 quickly led major record labels to
make their music video libraries available on You-
Tube (see TechCrunch 2007). However, most content
on YouTube is user generated. Consumers upload
videos of live performances, videos that embed the
lyrics of a song, or derivative works such as cover
versions and parodies (Liikkanen and Salovaara 2015).
ThroughYouTube’s Content ID technology, all videos
are matched to a database of copyrighted material.
When uploads are classified as infringing, rights
holders can choose between blocking the infringing
video and “monetizing” the content by sharing rev-
enue from advertisements. In testing, YouTube re-
ported that 90% of claims created through Content
ID led to rights holders choosing monetization (see
King 2008). Although this gives substantial control to
rights holders compared with closed platforms, it is
more difficult for artists or labels to entirelywithdraw
content from YouTube because new UGC is con-
stantly being uploaded.6
Overall, little is known about the relationship be-
tween original innovation and adaptations and de-
rivative works. The literature has focused on related
yet different questions. A stream of work studies how
user-generated knowledge affects firm innovation
(for a recent example, see Gambardella et al. 2017).
Empirical evidence on the role of intellectual prop-
erty (IP) rights shows that IP protection (or stronger
enforcement) hinders follow-on innovation, mea-
sured as subsequent academic knowledge creation
(Williams 2013), developer activity in open-source
software projects (Wen et al. 2013), and the number
of patent citations (Galasso and Schankerman 2015).
Hence, UGC (especially adaptations and derivative
work) may act complementarily to sales of official
content, or consumers may perceive such content as a
substitute. Regarding online music videos and record
sales, this implies that the fact that YouTube is an
open platform can shape its impact on recordedmusic
sales, and it is not clear in which direction.
2.3. Digital Distribution Platforms and Effects on
Consumption Patterns
Internet-enabled distribution platforms often offer a
variety of tools to aid content discovery. The reduction
in search cost has the potential to affect the sales
distribution (Anderson 2006). A first example is ag-
gregate top lists of the best-selling products in a given
product category, week, and geographic area. Ag-
gregate popularity information (observational learn-
ing) can drive concentration (Salganik et al. 2006,
Sorensen 2007, Cai et al. 2009, Hinz et al. 2011) but
also can benefit niche content when the same level of
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popularity implies higher quality of niche versus
broad-appeal products (Tucker and Zhang 2011).
More personalized recommendations can come di-
rectly from peers (often encouraged by platforms
making it easy to share content) or from algorithms
using social data. For example, evidence shows that
social interactions determine which videos on You-
Tube become successful (Susarla et al. 2012). Theo-
retical work argues that consumers with less common
preferences may benefit more from social recom-
mendations, which trigger demand for niche products
(Hervas-Drane 2015). This is supported by evidence
that the popularity distribution of e-commerce sales
can shift toward the tail (Oestreicher-Singer and
Sundararajan 2012a). Although search and recom-
mendation tools guide consumers to content they
were previously unaware of, they can also increase
the number of consumed units and the chance of
consuming content that many others are also con-
suming (Hosanagar et al. 2014). In our empirical
context, it is not clear how this trade-off plays out. Be-
cause musical content is heterogeneous in its breadth
of appeal and prior exposure, we also investigate
whether the effects differ when we distinguish be-
tween niche content (realized appeal) and new con-
tent (ex ante unknown appeal).
3. Institutional Background
3.1. Variation from YouTube and the GEMA Shock
YouTube is a unique setting to study the relationship
between the availability of online music videos and
recordedmusic sales.AlthoughYouTubehas contracts
with rights holders in most countries, the question
of compensation was subject to a long-standing legal
dispute between YouTube and GEMA in Germany.
GEMA is the state-authorized (de facto monopolist)
collecting society and performance rights organization
in Germany.7 Collecting societies are bodies that en-
sure that royalties from any kind of reproduction
(e.g., physical and digital reproduction, public per-
formance, etc.) reach artists and publishers, making
them important institutions for artists because roy-
alties are a major part of income, independent of
any private contracts with record labels (Kretschmer
2005). A large international network of sister collec-
tion societies represents the rights of German artists/
publishers in international markets, and GEMA does
the same for international artists/publishers in the
German market. That is, virtually every professional
musician is either directly or indirectly a member of
GEMA, which led to the so-called GEMA presump-
tion, a case law presuming that rights of all musical
works are managed by GEMA in Germany.8
The expiry of an initial agreement between You-
Tube and GEMA in 2009 triggered renewed negoti-
ations about the appropriate level of compensation.
In fear of high subsequent (and retrospective) pay-
ments, YouTube began blocking music videos on
April 1, 2009 (seeO’Brien 2009). The left-hand panel of
Figure 1, showing Google Trends search volume for
the term “gema” from April 2008 to April 2010, in-
dicates a spike in the week when the blocking began
but not much systematic movement before and after.
This suggests that the shock came unexpectedly to
consumers and most artists, publishers, and record
labels.9 The situation persisted until November 1,
2016, when YouTube and GEMA finally announced
that they had reached an agreement and the restric-
tions on music videos were lifted.10
However, this does not necessarily imply that Ger-
man YouTube users did not have access to any music
videos. Publishers/artists can negotiate independent
contracts with any online or offline licensee, so pub-
lishers and artists may drop out of GEMA to reach
individual agreements with YouTube in Germany.11
However, this may not be optimal. First, royalty in-
come from the collecting society comes from a variety
of digital (e.g., download and streaming services) and
physical (e.g., radio broadcasting and public per-
formance) sources. According to GEMA’s annual
report, online rights accounted for less than 2% of the
overall combined income from online, physical du-
plication, and radio and television in 2008.12 Hence,
income from digital distribution may be too small an
amount to forgo all other royalty income for most
artists. Second, by joining a collecting society, indi-
viduals benefit from reduced contracting costs and
increased bargaining power. This is even more ben-
eficial for members of international collecting socie-
ties, where it can be especially costly to negotiate with
various potential licensees abroad across different
legal systems. To avoid this potential endogeneity of
selecting into (or out of) YouTube in our estimates, we
focus on a very short time window of four weeks
before and after the blocking began on April 1, 2009.13
3.2. Long-Run Supply-Side Reactions and the
Launch of Vevo
The royalty dispute triggered a controversial dis-
cussion in the Germanmusic industry. Whereas some
artists agree with the position of GEMA because they
believe that YouTube’s royalty rates are too low,
others simply want their videos to be seen.14 Repre-
sentatives of Sony Music and Universal Music have
publicly criticized GEMA for not working harder
toward an agreement (see Spahr 2011).
Record labels are not members of GEMA (they
do not create music) and therefore do not receive
any royalty income. However, on top of a potential
positive effect on record sales, they directly benefit
from advertising revenues generated by YouTube.
Not surprisingly, therefore, record labels are heavily
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invested in online music video. Sony Music and
Universal Music, with a joint market share of more
than 46% in 2012, for example, holdmajority stakes in
the music video service Vevo.15 Since its launch in
2009, Vevo has been partneringwith YouTube inmost
countries. Accordingly, 97% of its 51.6 million unique
viewers accessed Vevo content through YouTube
in December 2012, making Vevo the most viewed
channel on YouTube, accounting for a third of all
unique viewers on YouTube (see Comscore 2013). As
a workaround for the GEMA–YouTube deadlock,
Vevo negotiated its own licensing deal with GEMA
and launched the dedicated platform Vevo.com—
with content hosted outside YouTube—in the Ger-
man market on October 1, 2013 (see Cookson 2013).
Overnight, 75,000 music videos became available on
the German internet. We use this event as an auxiliary
test for our general findings at a different time (2009
versus 2013), with a different scope (all musical content
versus content by two major labels), in a different di-
rection (making videos available versus unavailable),
and on a different type of platform (an open versus
closed platform that does not allow for UGC).
4. Data
We construct a unique data set by matching sales
information to song- and artist-specific metadata and
measures of online video availability from a variety of
sources. Table 1 gives a summary and definitions of
all variables used in this paper; descriptive statistics
of the key variables are in Table 2.
4.1. Sales Data
Sales data come from GfK Entertainment, a market
research firm collecting weekly (scanner) data. The
data include information from 50 (online and offline)
retail outlet chains and 27 digital retailers in Germany
andAustria that collectively represent more than 90%
of all retailers.
We have access to the weekly number of units sold
for the subsample of all songs that were among the
1,000 highest grossing songs (based on cumulative
sales across all distribution channels) at least once
in weeks 10–23 of 2009 in the physical channel (in
Germany and Austria) and the digital download
channel (in Germany). We also have sales informa-
tion for weeks 36–44 of 2013. For 2013, we observe
physical sales (in Germany and Austria) and digital
downloads (in Germany and Austria), and we can
distinguish between the number of weekly streams
via free services and subscription-based services (in
Germany). Note that YouTube and Vevo plays are
not included in the latter variable. For most ana-
lyses, we use a four-week window around the re-
spective experiments.
The data cover sales of individual songs. In the
physical sales channel, this is equivalent to the sales of
singles, which implies that the song has been released
on a physical medium—and stocked in brick-and-
mortar outlets—for us to observe positive sales fig-
ures.16 In the digital channel, our data capture sales of
songs independent of whether they are released as
stand-alone products (digital single) or as part of an
album. This is because consumers can (almost) al-
ways buy any individual song on an album in digital
record stores. This is reflected in the share of digital
song sales in our data; on average, it is 79% in 2009
and 97% in 2013. Looking at aggregate sales figures
covering the top 1,000 best-selling albums in the
German market in the same period, the digital share
of top 1,000 album sales is 5% in 2009 and 18% in 2013.
This is in line with industry reports in which the digital
share in overall sales figures (songs and albums, entire
Figure 1. Google Search Volume for GEMA and Vevo
Source. Google Trends.
Notes. The figure shows relative Google search volumes for “gema” and “vevo” in Germany for April 2008–April 2010 (left panel) and October
2012–October 2014 (right panel), respectively. Vertical lines indicate the sample period for the econometric analysis.
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German market) is 11% in 2009 and 23% in 2013.17 We
prefer to run our analysis at the song level because
music videos are directly linked to individual songs,
not entire albums. In fact, as we show in Section 6.3.1,
the choice of level of aggregation is an important
aspect when comparing our results with those of the
prior literature.
Comparing the head and tail of the top 1,000 list
shows that it covers a very large fraction of the
market. In our data, songs at the bottom of the list
never sell more than 12 units (physical and digital
combined) in a given week in the 2009 sample and
never more than 20 units/12 streams in the 2013
sample, whereas the top song sells, on average, 37,871
units in 2009 and 28,121 units and 543,653 streams
in 2013. Hence, demand for songs that do not make
it to the top 1,000 list is small in both relative and
absolute terms. However, we do not only track
songs while they are part of the top 1,000 list. For
each song that appears in the top 1,000 list at some
point in our observation period, our data also let us
observe sales figures in weeks where the song is not
included in the top 1,000 list but available for pur-
chase or streaming.
4.2. Metainformation
We match metainformation such as the release date
and information on other releases of the same artist,
genre, geographic origin of the artist, and record
label using data from MusicBrainz, an online plat-
form for music enthusiasts. MusicBrainz contains
user-generated information on approximately 20.5
million songs. Crucial information for our analysis,
especially exact release dates (not only month or
year), are not available for every song, but in some
cases, we found additional information from other
sources, such as iTunes, Wikipedia, and Discogs.
Data on prior international success of an artist come
from historical chart rankings in the United States
(week 1 of 2000–week 36 of 2013) from Billboard.
We note some technical details. We do not observe
unique common identifiers across the various data-
bases, which is why we rely on a comparison of text
strings, that is, artist names and song titles. Because
the additional data sets are very large and we need
to match multiple ones, going through each combi-
nation of potential matches is close to impossible.
Furthermore, variations in artist names and song titles
(e.g., “featuring,” “feat.,” “(Radio Version),” “(Club
Mix)”) make one-to-one matching too restrictive,
potentially causing (too many) matching errors. Be-
cause manual inspection of match candidates is po-
tentially error prone and there is no structuredway to
quantify error rates, we develop a statistical matching
algorithm.18 We compare pairs of potential matches
along a number of metrics (such as the Levenshtein
distance or Soundex), manually code a random sub-
sample (training data, n = 7,654) to estimate param-
eters of a logit model, and use those parameters to
estimate match probabilities in the full sample. From
the statistical properties of the underlying model and
training data, we can estimate error rates. Our model
performs at an estimated rate of 4.4% of type I errors
and 4.6% type II errors. This is much more precise
Table 1. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
Total (ln + 1) Weekly number of sold units (physical plus digital)
Physical (ln + 1) Weekly number of physically sold units
Digital (ln + 1)a Weekly number of digitally sold units
Streaming: Total (ln + 1)b Weekly number of streams (free plus premium)
Streaming: Free (ln + 1)b Weekly number of streams on free streaming services (not including YouTube and Vevo)
Streaming: Premium (ln + 1)b Weekly number of streams on subscription-based streaming services
Independent variables
After (0/1) Weeks after 2009 week 14/2013 week 40 (GEMA shock/entry of Vevo)
Video (0/1) (At least one) song-specific video on U.S. YouTube uploaded prior to April 1, 2009, by Vevo
Germany (0/1) Data from Germany
Vevo Label (0/1) Universal Music or Sony Music (and their subsidiaries)
UGC: Small Share (0/1) Share of official song-specific videos is bigger than or equal to that of the average song in the sample
UGC: Official and UGC (0/1) Share of official song-specific videos is smaller than that of the average song in the sample
UGC: Only UGC (0/1) Only user-generated song-specific videos
Newcomer: Two Months (0/1) Earliest release of an artist not more than two months before GEMA shock
Newcomer: No Album (0/1) Artist has never released an album before the GEMA shock
Newcomer: First Year (0/1) Earliest release of an artist not more than one year before GEMA shock
Niche: Never U.S. (0/1) Artist never appeared on theU.S. charts (albumand single), 2000week 1–2009week 14/2000week 1–2013week 36
Niche: German (0/1) Artist has German origin
Niche: Genre (0/1) Song is not in a mainstream genre (i.e., not pop or rock)
aData are not available for Austria in 2009.
bData are available only for Germany in 2013.
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than the heuristic approaches that are commonly
used in the related literature (e.g., a reduction of 16
percentage points in the type I error rate in the best-
performing method discussed in Raffo and Lhuillery
(2009, figure 4)). Our final data set includes 1,542
songs from 999 artists.
4.3. Music Video Data
To build a song-level measure of video availability on
YouTube, we would ideally observe which songs had
corresponding videos on the German YouTube just
before the ban on April 1, 2009. Because such his-
torical data are not available, we construct a proxy by
gathering the first 20 search results (this reflects
the first page of search results on YouTube) from a
query of artist name and song title on the U.S. version
of YouTube (using YouTube’s application program-
ming interface).19 In many cases, not all videos that
YouTube returns for a song are directly related to that
song. Sometimes we observe videos related to other
songs of the same artist, songs from similar artists, etc.
We treat videos as relevant if the video title includes
the artist’s name and at least three words of the song
title. Using the upload date of each thus defined
video, we construct our measure of availability. We
set the dummy variable Videoi to one if at least one
video corresponding to song i was uploaded be-
fore April 1, 2009. Identification of the YouTube effect
will thus come from differences between songs that
had corresponding videos on YouTube and those that
did not.
We use data from the U.S. YouTube because we can
realistically assume that the German YouTube would
offer the same content as the U.S. YouTube had the
GEMA shock not happened. A simple plausibility
check for the latter is to compare U.S. search results
with those from Austria, Germany’s neighbor, which
shares the same language and similar culture but was
not affected by the GEMA shock. George and Peukert
(2014) conduct such an exercise with a random se-
lection of almost 1,000 songs released between 2006
and 2011, collecting search results on the German,
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
No video Video Total
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Sample of the GEMA shock,
2009 weeks 10–18
log(Total + 1) 1.783 2.277 3.575 2.168 2.764 2.390
log(Physical + 1) 0.507 1.306 0.910 1.675 0.728 1.532
log(Download + 1) 1.673 2.229 3.482 2.158 2.664 2.369
After 0.451 0.498 0.449 0.497 0.450 0.497
Video 0 0 1 0 0.548 0.498
UGC: Small Share 0 0 0.278 0.448 0.152 0.359
UGC: Official and UGC 0 0 0.221 0.415 0.121 0.326
UGC: Only UGC 0 0 0.501 0.500 0.275 0.446
Newcomer: Two Months 0.028 0.165 0.045 0.206 0.037 0.189
Newcomer: No Album 0.046 0.210 0.040 0.195 0.043 0.202
Newcomer: First Year 0.065 0.247 0.065 0.246 0.065 0.247
Niche: Never U.S. 0.821 0.383 0.642 0.480 0.723 0.448
Niche: German 0.616 0.486 0.470 0.499 0.536 0.499
Niche: Genre 0.469 0.499 0.355 0.479 0.407 0.491
Number of songs 700 842 1,542
Number of artists 535 549 999
Observations 6,202 7,509 13,711
Sample of the Vevo entry,
2013 weeks 36–44
log(Total + 1) 3.333 2.058 3.869 2.030 3.576 2.062
log(Physical + 1) 0.199 0.796 0.207 0.835 0.203 0.814
log(Download + 1) 3.315 2.065 3.857 2.031 3.561 2.068
log(Total Streams + 1) 4.776 4.079 5.583 3.908 5.142 4.023
log(Free Streams + 1) 3.150 4.118 3.726 4.240 3.411 4.184
log(Premium Streams + 1) 4.547 3.832 5.323 3.669 4.899 3.779
After 0.588 0.492 0.574 0.495 0.582 0.493
Video 0 0 1 0 0.454 0.498
Vevo Label 0.016 0.127 0.021 0.144 0.019 0.135
Number of songs 937 759 1,696
Number of artists 631 485 1,027
Observations 7,962 6,614 14,576
Note. SD, standard deviation.
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Austrian, andU.S. versions of YouTube for each song.
Table 3 shows that the share of directly relevant
videos on the first result page (defined as earlier) is
not significantly different in the United States and
Austria but 2.7 percentage points lower in Germany.
The share of total views (sumof views of all 500 videos
on the first 20 result pages) on the first result page in
the United States and Austria is about 82% (no sig-
nificant difference). This share is about 75% in Ger-
many. Almost 9% of the relevant videos on the first
result page are official videos in the United States and
Austria (no significant difference); in Germany, this
share is only 5%.20 This suggests that the Austrian
version of YouTube looks very much like the U.S.
version of YouTube, whereas top search results on the
German YouTube are clearly different.
In essence, therefore, we have a measure of video
availability just before the ban, based on the U.S.
YouTube, not the German YouTube, which, how-
ever, is likely to be essentially the same before April
2009. For 54% of the songs in our sample, there is at
least one corresponding YouTube video that predates
the GEMA shock. The seemingly high share of songs
without videos is plausible because it is likely that
a substantial number of artists and record labels
believed that YouTube displaces record sales and
did therefore not upload official content and ac-
tively sent takedown requests for UGC. In the online
appendix, we report lists of the top 20 (based on
their peak rankings in our observation period) songs
with videos and without videos. Songs without
videos tend to have lower peak ranks than songs
with videos. Consistent with this, descriptive sta-
tistics in Table 2 show that songs with videos have
substantially higher average sales.21 However, as
long as this difference is constant, it will cancel out in
the difference-in-differences model. In the econo-
metric model, we control for unobserved factors
that may be correlated with such differences via
song fixed effects and week fixed effects and show
that the identifying assumption of the difference-in-
differences model holds.
Similarly, wewould like to observewhich songs had
corresponding videos on the German Vevo website
when it was launched on October 1, 2013. Vevo does
not provide such a list, but we can make use of the fact
that Vevo is part of YouTube in many other countries,
including the United States. The underlying assump-
tion is that the content on Vevo’s standalone German
platform is the same as Vevo’s content on YouTube.22
We take advantage of the fact that Vevo uses artist-
specific usernames to upload videos to YouTube.
For example, the corresponding username for offi-
cial videos by Justin Bieber is JustinBieberVevo. Ac-
cordingly, we define a song as having a Vevo video if
at least one song-specific video is uploaded by Vevo,
which is the case for 37% of the songs in our sample.23
To identify official non-Vevo videos, we manually
went through the official YouTube accounts of artists
and record labels and flagged videos as official if
they were uploaded by these accounts. The average
share of official videos among the relevant YouTube
results is 6%. Accordingly, the average share of user-
generated videos is 94%. Casual inspection of those
videos suggests that these are mostly live and lyric
videos, remixes and cover versions, and a very few
parodies (see Liikkanen and Salovaara 2015).
4.4. Heterogeneity
We distinguish between established and newcomer
artists in several ways using information on all his-
torical releases of an artist. First, we defineNewcomer:
Two Months as a dummy variable indicating whether
the first release of an artist did not appear before
February 1, 2009. We observe 59 songs in this cate-
gory. Similarly, Newcomer: First Year is defined as an
Table 3. YouTube in the United States, Germany, and Austria
Country Share of directly relevant videos Share of total views Official video share
United States
Mean 0.7755 0.8250 0.0868
Standard error 0.0014 0.0014 0.0025
Austria
Mean 0.7726 0.8213 0.0893
Standard error 0.0014 0.0014 0.0026
Germany
Mean 0.7485 0.7483 0.0502
Standard error 0.0016 0.0021 0.0020
Source. George and Peukert (2014).
Notes. Results are based on the top 20 YouTube search results for 950 randomly selected songs
released between 2006 and 2011 (based on data from MusicBrainz). The search was carried out on
August 21, 2014. Relevancy is defined as a YouTube video title containing the artist name and at least
three words of the song title. Total views are calculated as the cumulative number of views of all 500
videos shown on the first 20 result pages. Official videos are identified by the word “official” in the title
or uploader name.
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indicator of whether the first release of an artist did
not appear before April 1, 2008. This identifies 102
newcomer songs. Our third variable, Newcomer: No
Album, indicates whether the artist never released an
album before the GEMA shock, that is, April 1, 2009.
The number of newcomer songs for this definition is 68.
Prominent examples of newcomers according to these
definitions are Oceana, Steve Appleton, Katy Perry,
and Lady Gaga.
We then define three empirical measures of main-
streamversus nichemusic. First, we use historical sales
data from the United States (Billboard Top 100 single
and album charts) to define ameasure of international
success. Examples of German artists that appeared at
least once on the Billboard charts include Cascada,
Sarah Connor, and Tokio Hotel. However, consistent
with the evidence in Ferreira and Waldfogel (2013)
showing that Germany almost exclusively exports
music to Austria and Switzerland, these are excep-
tions. Accordingly, our first measure of niche artists
consists of 638 artists who never appear in theU.S. top
charts, which we include in the category Niche: Never
U.S. Second, based on data about their geographic
origin, we classify 601 artists as Niche: German. This
represents 60% of all artists in our data, which again is
consistent with the estimate of the domestic share of
music consumption in Ferreira andWaldfogel (2013).
Third, we identify the best-selling genres by looking
at cumulative sales in our data. Pop and rock account
for 74% of overall sales in the German market before
the GEMA shock such that we include all other genres
in the category Niche: Genre.
One might be concerned that songs of newcomer
or niche artists differ in their video availability. The
descriptive statistics in Table 2 do not confirm this.
Applying Bayes’ theorem, we see that the probabil-
ity that a song does not have a video if it is from a
niche artist is roughly 50%, independent of how we
measure Niche.24 The probability that a song does not
have a video if it is from a newcomer artist is between
34%and 48%, depending on the definition ofNewcomer.
5. Empirical Specification and Results
We first introduce and discuss the identification strat-
egy and then report our baseline results on the average
effect of online music videos on recorded music sales.
We go on to test whether this effect is driven by dif-
ferences in the song-specific amount of official con-
tent and UGC on YouTube. Finally, we investigate
heterogeneity and distinguish between new artists
and niche artists. We report results of additional
analyses (some of which are described in more detail
in the online appendix) that largely support the ro-
bustness of our results and help us rule out alter-
native explanations.
5.1. Identification Strategy
We identify the effect of music videos on sales of
recorded music using exogenous variation from re-
moving access to videos on YouTube in a difference-
in-differencesmodel. Essentially, we compare sales of
songs with videos with sales of songs without videos
before and after the natural experiment. Our baseline
specification can be written as




βtwt + δ Aftert × Videoi( ) + μi + εit, (1)
where Saleski,t are unit sales of song i via channel k
(physical, digital) in week t, Videoi is our measure of
video availability and defines the treatment group,
and Aftert indicates the time period after the GEMA
shock. Our estimate of the causal effect of the ex-
periment is δ. We further include week fixed effects βt
and song fixed effects μi to control for unobserved
song-specific, time-invariant and time-specific, song-
invariant heterogeneity. Because of these fixed ef-
fects, we implicitly control for but cannot separately
identify coefficients for Videoi and Aftert. Our pre-
ferred specification reports standard error estimates
clustered at the song level.
The identifying assumption in any difference-in-
differences setting is that the treatment and control
groups would have followed similar trends in the
dependent variable had the policy shock not hap-
pened. A necessary condition for this assumption to
hold is that trends in the dependent variables of the
treatment and control groups are parallel before the
experiment. To see whether this condition holds, we
can plot a sales measure over time. In Figure 2, we
partial out song fixed effects and plot averaged re-
siduals for each group and each week regarding total
sales, physical sales, and digital sales. The plot shows
that the treatment and control groups follow similar
trends before the GEMA shock and start to diverge
substantially afterward. Noting that the 90% confi-
dence bands (calculated using the standard error of
the mean) overlap in the preshock period, we can
conclude that the parallel trends assumption is con-
sistent with our data. More formally, we can test
whether the difference in the dependent variable
across points in time is zero in the preshock period, as
is often done in the literature (for one of the first
applications of this idea, see Autor 2003).We estimate
a model defined as







βt1 wt × Videoi( ) + μi + εit, (2)
in which we can test, week by week, whether treat-
ment and control groups differ in their sales dynamics
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(H0 : βt1  0). Table 4 shows estimates of βt1 coefficients
for total sales, physical sales, and digital sales in
the preshock period. Across almost all columns and
preexperimentweeks,we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the difference in sales in the treatment and
control groups is equal to zero. Although these results
are reassuring, we discuss an alternative identifica-
tion strategy (using cross-country variation) and a
falsification exercise (placebo country and timing)
after the baseline results below.
5.2. Displacement or Promotion?
5.2.1. Baseline Results. Our baseline results are re-
ported in Table 5.25 In columns (1) and (5), we report
the results of an aggregated model specification,
where we look at total sales of a song as an average in
the pre- and postshock periods. This specification lets
us address the potential issue that serial correlation
may lead to incorrect inference (Bertrand et al. 2004).
We further report results of different methods of
estimating standard errors (clustered at the artist
level in column (1) and clustered at the song level in
column (5)). The estimated difference-in-differences
coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level.
The point estimate is −0.142, which implies a decrease
of 13%.26
Turning to the preferred disaggregated sample in
columns (2) and (6), we get very similar results. The
point estimate translates into a percentage reduction
of 14% of total sales, with the 90% confidence interval
(CI) between −21% and −6%. Because it is likely that
the temporal correlation structure of sales of the same
song is stronger than those of sales of different songs
by the same artist, we continue to report results with
standard errors clustered at the song level in the rest
of this paper.
In columns (3) and (4) and columns (7) and (8), re-
spectively, of Table 5, we distinguish between phys-
ical and digital sales of the same song. Although the
point estimate for physical sales is half the size of
the point estimate for digital sales (−7% versus −14%),
the coefficients are not statistically different from each
other in the sense that 90% CI bands overlap. Hence,
we conclude that YouTube’s average effect on sales of
songs is not statistically different regarding physical
and digital sales.
5.2.2. Alternative Identification Strategy and Falsifica-
tion Exercises. An alternative identification strategy
that does not use song-specific information on video
availability is to compare sales in Germany with sales
in a different country not affected by the GEMA
shock. Austria, Germany’s neighbor, which shares
the same language and similar culture, is a prime
candidate. In this exercise, we assume that the GEMA
Table 4. Group Differences in the Period Before the
GEMA Shock
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Total Physical Digital
t−4 × Video 0.113∗ 0.075 0.097
(0.068) (0.046) (0.066)
t−3 × Video 0.091 −0.004 0.117∗
(0.062) (0.042) (0.060)
t−2 × Video 0.036 −0.018 0.055
(0.058) (0.036) (0.056)
t−1 × Video −0.013 −0.003 0.000
(0.046) (0.029) (0.045)
Observations 7,543 7,543 7,543
R2 0.922 0.920 0.924
Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1) Weekly Sales in units. The
term Video indicates that at least one song-specific video was
uploaded on the U.S. YouTube prior to April 1, 2009. Sample only
includes weeks before the GEMA shock. Song and week fixed effects
and the constant are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the song level.∗p < 0.10.
Figure 2. (Color online) Trends of Treatment and Control Groups Before and After the GEMA Shock
Notes. The vertical axis in each panel shows the average demeaned total/digital/physical sales, that is, averaged residuals ŷvt  ŷit − μ̂i derived
from the model yit  log(Salesit + 1)  α +∑t βt0wt +∑t βt1(wt × Videoi) + μi + εit for Videoi  0 and Videoi  1. The horizontal axis shows weeks
before and after April 1, 2009. Lines with filled markers (control group) show the average sales of songs without at least one video uploaded to
the U.S. YouTube before April 1, 2009. Lines with hollow markets (treatment group) show the average sales of songs with at least one video
uploaded to the U.S. YouTube before April 1, 2009. Error bars indicate the 90% confidence bands (standard error of the mean).
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shock affected all songs in the sameway in the German
market, that is, that all songs have corresponding
videos on YouTube that are all blocked. In Table 6, we
report results of a model that compares sales of a song
in Austria with its sales in Germany, before and after
the GEMA shock. Note that digital sales data do not
exist for Austria, so we can compare only physical
sales. The number of observations is accordingly
twice as large as in the disaggregated specifications
(columns (2)–(4) and (6)–(8) of Table 5). Because we
have two observations per song, we can identify a
country coefficient. Given that Germany is a larger
market than Austria, this coefficient is positive and
significant, as expected. The difference-in-differences
coefficientAfter×Germany is negative and significant.
The effect size is −7% (90% CI, [−12%, −1%]).
We also perform two falsification exercises. First,
we estimate placebo versions of our model pretend-
ing that the GEMA shock took place either two weeks
before or twoweeks after it actually did.As illustrated
in Figure 3, we split the sample of our baseline model
(running from t−4 to t+4) in two parts and estimate
models on the two subsamples running from t−4 to t
and from t to t+4, setting the respective dates of the
placebo experiments to t−2 and t+2; that is, we run two
types of placebos. For the first, if there is no general
underlying trend, we should expect an effect that is
close to zero. For the second,we expect an effect that is
close to zero only if we assume that the effect of the
real experiment is instantaneous and constant. Hence,
we can take this exercise as a test of whether the effect
of the true experiment is immediate and whether it
changes in the observed time frame.27
In the results reported in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 7,28 we define the after period to include the
week of the placebo experiment, but we get very
similar estimates if we treat the placebo experiment
week as part of the before period. The coefficients of
After×Video in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 are small
and not significantly different from zero, suggesting
that our results are not driven by a general trend that
started before the GEMA shock and that the effect of
the shock persists. Table 7 reports only results con-
cerning total sales as the dependent variable, but we
also do not find significant effects when we distin-
guish between physical and digital sales. Second, we
run a country-based placebo exercise and estimate
our model on data from Austria. If our results are
driven by confounding temporal variation that co-
incides with the GEMA shock, we should see a similar
effect in Austria. Alternatively, because music videos
on YouTube remained available for Austrian con-
sumers, we should not see any change in the Austrian
sales of songs that are affected by the experiments in
Germany. This is indeed what the data tell in column
(3) of Table 7. We find that songs with videos on
YouTube do not have significantly different sales in
Austria compared with songs without videos on
YouTube before and after the GEMA shock in Ger-
many. The coefficient is very close to zero.
Although our results are robust to a number of
specifications, some concerns regarding data structure
Table 5. Baseline Results: Average Effect of the GEMA Shock on Song Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable Total (avg) Total Physical Digital Total (avg) Total Physical Digital
After × Video −0.142∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.072∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.072∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.050) (0.037) (0.049) (0.070) (0.052) (0.037) (0.051)
Observations 3,084 13,711 13,711 13,711 3,084 13,711 13,711 13,711
SE cluster Song Song Song Song Artist Artist Artist Artist
R2 0.918 0.892 0.877 0.894 0.918 0.892 0.877 0.894
Notes. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (5) is the average log(1 +Weekly Total Sales) of song i in
the preshock period and postshock period. For all other columns, the dependent variable is log(1 +
Weekly Total/Physical/Digital Sales) of song i in week t. The variable Video indicates that at least one
song-specific videowas uploaded on the U.S. YouTube prior to April 1, 2009. The variableAfter indicates
weeks after April 1, 2009. All models include song fixed effects, and in columns (2)–(4) and (6)–(8), we
additionally include week fixed effects. The constant is not reported. Standard errors (SEs) are in
parentheses, clustered at the song/artist level. avg, Average.∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.








Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1) weekly physical sales in units
(digital sales are not available for Austria). Song and week fixed
effects and the constant are not reported. Standard errors in are
parentheses, clustered at the song level.∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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and measurement error may remain. In the online
appendix, we speculate on the possible effects of
measurement error, show that our results are broadly
robust to different estimation windows, and con-
clude that the results are not likely to be driven by
price changes.
5.3. The Role of Content Type and Platform Type
One of the specific features of YouTube as a licensed
open platform is that it can host both official content
and UGC. We provide two tests of whether this
distinction can lead to different effects on sales. First,
as described earlier, we separate the available song-
specific videos by official content and UGC. Second,
wemake use of the fact that Vevo is a closed platform,
where only rights holders themselves can contribute,
and estimate how its launch affected sales of recorded
music across different distribution channels.
5.3.1. User-Generated Content. Table 8 reports results
from a specification where we define dummy vari-
ables based on the share of official content and UGC.
We categorize songs based on the amount of official
content and UGC on YouTube. On average, the share
of official videos in the directly related search results
is 6%. The median is zero and the 75th percentile
is 10%. We define a song as having a Small UGC Share
if the share of official videos is larger than 10%, which
is roughly equivalent to two official videos on You-
Tube’s first result page.29 Songs without any official
videos are categorized as Only UGC. Accordingly,
songs with a share of official videos of between 0%
and 10% are classified as Official and UGC. Similar to
the baseline specification earlier, the omitted category
is comprised of songs without videos. We report
results for total sales (column (1)), physical sales
(column (2)), and digital sales (column (3)). The point
estimates of After × Small UGC Share, After × Official
and UGC, and After × Only UGC are very similar.
We interpret these results as evidence that the effect
of music videos on record music sales operates in
a similar fashion independent of whether there is
more or less UGC on YouTube. In the online ap-
pendix, we show that the parallel trends assumption
is supported by the data. The pre-GEMA shock sales
dynamics of treatment (Small UGC Share, Official and
UGC, Only UGC) and control songs do not system-
atically vary by the amount of user-generated video
content on YouTube.
5.3.2. The Entry of Vevo. The GEMA shock was partly
reversed when Universal Music and Sony Music
launched their own music video platform, Vevo, on
October 1, 2013. Although it is independently inter-
esting to ask whether the availability and unavail-
ability of music videos affect sales to comparable
magnitudes (but with opposite signs), the entry of
Vevo lets us speak to the role of UGC from another
angle. Vevo only hosts official videos, whereas You-
Tube hosts a large share of UGC videos. Table 9
replicates our baseline regressions with data cover-
ing four weeks before and four weeks after the Vevo
launch. As described in Section 4.3, we can measure
whether song-specific music videos were available on
Table 7. Falsification Exercises: Placebo Experiments
Timing Country
−2 weeks +2 weeks Austria
Variable (1) (2) (3)
After × Video −0.034 −0.037 0.001
(0.060) (0.043) (0.001)
Observations 4,144 3,852 13,711
R2 0.803 0.734 0.755
Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1) Weekly Total Sales in units,
in Germany (columns (1) and (2)) and Austria (column (3)). Column (3)
includes only physical sales because digital sales data are not available
for Austria. The term Video indicates that at least one song-specific
video was uploaded on the U.S. YouTube prior to April 1, 2009. Song
and week fixed effects and constant are not reported. Standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered at the song level.
Table 8. Official vs. User-Generated Content
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Total Physical Download
After × Small UGC Share −0.183∗∗∗ −0.085 −0.199∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.062) (0.066)
After × Official and UGC −0.146∗ −0.090 −0.155∗∗
(0.075) (0.058) (0.074)
After × Only UGC −0.126∗∗ −0.057 −0.126∗∗
(0.061) (0.043) (0.060)
Observations 13,711 13,711 13,711
R2 0.892 0.877 0.894
Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1) Weekly Sales in units in
2009. The term Small UGC Share indicates that more than 10% of the
song-specific videos on the U.S. YouTube uploaded prior to April 1,
2009, were uploaded from an official account. The term Official and
UGC indicates a share of official videos of between 0% and 10%. The
termOnly UGC indicates that no video was uploaded from an official
account. The omitted category is No Video. Song and week fixed
effects and the constant are not reported. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the song/artist level.∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Figure 3. Falsification Exercises: Timing of Placebo
Experiments
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the new Vevo platform because Vevo operates within
the YouTube platform in almost all countries except
Germany. For 2013, we can observe not only unit
sales in the physical and digital purchase channels
(columns (1)–(3)) but also how often a particular song
was streamed on free and premium licensed closed
streaming sites (not including YouTube and Vevo;
columns (4)–(6)).
Wefind point estimates remarkably similar to those
in our analysis of the GEMA shock yet with the
(expected) opposite sign. Looking at the difference-in-
differences estimate in columns (1) and (4) of Table 9,
the entry of Vevo increased total record sales by about
10% (90% CI, [2%, 18%]) and the number of weekly
streams by about 16% (90% CI, [2%, 33%]). Although
it is important to note that these coefficients are less
precisely estimated than the coefficients reported in
Table 5, perhaps because the entry of Vevo is a less
clean experiment and because of the small number of
physical copies sold in 2013, our Vevo results are not
statistically different from the GEMA results because
the absolute confidence bands overlap for all common
coefficients. In the online appendix, we run a series of
robustness checks that make us confident that the
direction of our estimates reflects the causal effect of
the Vevo entry. First, we show that the sales/streams
of songs without Vevo videos and songs with Vevo
videos follow similar trends before entry. Second,
we show that the results hold under an alternative
identification strategy (treating all songs released by
Universal and Sony as affected). Third, we show that
there are no significant effects when we run falsifi-
cation exercises based on placebo timing or placebo
geography. Fourth, we can rule out that the effect is
driven by price changes that temporally coincidewith
the entry of Vevo.
5.4. Effect Heterogeneity
We now go beyond the average effect and look into
effect heterogeneity. We allow for heterogeneity at
the level of popularity in terms of sales, investigating
the effect of the GEMA shock at various points of
the sales distribution. We then allow for heterogeneity
according to consumer awareness and the breadth
of an artist’s appeal. We estimate triple difference
models by adding the additional interaction terms
δ1(Aftert × Xi) and δ2(Aftert×Videoi×Xi) toEquation (1),
where Xi ∈ {Newcomeri,Nichei}. Under the null hy-
pothesis δ2  0, we can directly test whether the effect
of the GEMA shock differs across observations where
Xi  0 and Xi  1. The total effect for observations
where Xi  1 is δ̂1 + δ̂2.
5.4.1. Overall Popularity. The results in Table 10 sug-
gest that the average baseline effect does not differ
significantly by overall popularity. We test for dif-
ferences in the effect of the GEMA shock on sales
across the distribution of the sales variable in a
number of ways. We begin by exploring variation in
the amount of time songs stay in the top 1,000 ranking
to capture the notion that songs that stay in the
top 1,000 ranking for longer are more popular. In
column (1) of Table 10, we test for differences be-
tween songs that stay in the top 1,000 sales ranking
throughout the observed period and those that drop
out at some point. The effect of the GEMA shock on
the latter, estimated as the coefficient After × Video,
is −10% and therefore about four percentage points
smaller than the coefficient in our baseline results
in column (2) of Table 5. The 90% CI band ranges
between −19% and −1%. We do not find a significant
difference, as indicated in the coefficient of After ×
Video × AlwaysInTop1k. Adding the two, the total ef-
fect for songs that always stay in the top 1,000 ranking
is −5%, but its 90% CI band overlaps substantially
with that of the effect for songs that drop out of the top
1,000 list ([−15%, 5%]). Hence, we cannot interpret as
evidence thatmore popular songs exhibit a less strong
promotional effect from online music videos. In col-
umn (2) of Table 10, we go one step further and test
whether the effect of the GEMA shock is different for
even more popular songs. In the subset of songs that
always remain in the top 1,000 list, we distinguish
between those that never fall below rank 200 over
the observed period and those that do.30 Again, we
find no significant difference. The effect for songs that
exit the top 200 is −10% (90% CI, [−17%, −2%]),
whereas the effect for those that stay within the top
200 is 2%, yet this estimate is very imprecise (90%CI,
[−14%, 22%]). We continue to test whether songs at
the top of the preexperiment sales distribution re-
spond differently to the GEMA shock in column (3).
Comparing songs in the 95th percentile with all
others, we do not find a significant difference at the
top of the preexperiment sales distribution. The im-
plied effect for songs outside the 95th percentile is−12%
(90%CI, [−19%, −4%]). The implied effect for songs in
Table 9. Average Effect of Vevo’s Entry on Record Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Total Physical Digital Total Free Premium
After × Video 0.092∗∗ 0.021 0.087∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.133 0.143∗
(0.042) (0.018) (0.042) (0.081) (0.101) (0.076)
Observations 14,576 14,576 14,576 14,576 14,576 14,576
R2 0.858 0.889 0.859 0.898 0.852 0.896
Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1) Weekly Sales/Streams in
units in 2013. The term Video indicates that at least one song-specific
video was uploaded on the U.S. YouTube by Vevo. Song and week
fixed effects and the constant are not reported. Standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the song level.∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05.
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the 95th percentile is −6% but very imprecisely esti-
mated (90% CI, [−26%, 19%]). Again, these results do
not suggest that more popular songs exhibit a sig-
nificantly weaker promotional effect from online
music videos. In columns (4) and (5) of Table 10, we
estimate quantile regressions for different percentiles
of the dependent variable.Note that in these exercises,
we look at pre- and postexperiment sales. The results
suggest the effect of the GEMA shock is −16% at
the 5th percentile of the total sales distribution
(90% CI, [−25%, −5%]), and −19% at the 95th per-
centile (90% CI, [−37%, 6%]). Finally, in column (6),
we report the results of a weighted regression, where
we give observations with higher average sales in the
preexperiment period a relatively larger weight. The
point estimate is −13% (90% CI, [−24%, −1%]), still
very similar to the baseline estimate in column (2)
of Table 5.
These exercises do not support the notion that
the average treatment effect in our setting affects
different parts of the sales distribution differently.
However, the above analysis did not consider that
certain groups of observations may respond differ-
ently to the GEMA shock, which may affect sales of
these groups but is subtle enough to not affect the
overall popularity distribution. From a management
and policy perspective, therefore, it is important to
uncover this type of heterogeneity.
5.4.2. Consumer Awareness. Our measures of con-
sumer awareness (defined in Section 4.4) are based on
the idea that consumers are less aware of new artists
than of established artists.31
Results in columns (1)–(3) of Table 11 show that
newcomer artists are affected more strongly than
established artists. The triple interaction term is neg-
ative in all columns and significant in columns (2)
and (3), suggesting that total record sales of new art-
ists decrease more when music videos are blocked
on YouTube.
The point estimate in column (1) translates into a
−12% effect for established artists (90% CI, [−19%,
−5%]) and −50% for new artists (90% CI, [−75%,
2%]).32 Column (2) suggests that total record sales
decrease by 11% for established artists (90% CI,
[−18%, −3%]), and by 54% for new artists (90% CI,
[−75%, −14%]). The point estimates in column (3) of
Table 11 are −11% for established artists (90% CI,
[−18%, −3%]) and −46% for new artists (90% CI,
[−50%, −41%]). These results are consistent with the
notion that YouTube promotes artists who are less
known to consumers. Although only the specification
in column (3) shows that the differences between
established and new artists are significant, it is im-
portant to note that the statistical precision in Table 11
is impacted by the fact that the number of observa-
tions that qualify as newcomers (in either definition)
is relatively small.33
Table 10. Heterogeneity: Overall Popularity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Time Prerank Presales 5th pctl. 95th pctl. Weighted
After × Video −0.110∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.125∗∗ −0.171∗∗ −0.207 −0.141∗
(0.060) (0.052) (0.052) (0.074) (0.159) (0.080)
After × AlwaysInTop1k −0.350∗∗∗
(0.071)
After × Video × AlwaysInTop1k 0.055
(0.088)
After × AlwaysInTop200 −0.414∗∗∗
(0.103)
After × Video × AlwaysInTop200 0.124
(0.120)
After × 95th pctl. −0.547∗∗∗
(0.133)
After × Video × 95th pctl. 0.060
(0.154)
Observations 13,711 2,799 13,711 13,711 13,711 13,711
R2 0.892 0.916 0.892
Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1)Weekly Total Sales in units. Song andweek fixed effects are used
in columns (1) and (5), columns (2)–(4) are quantile regressions with differenced-out song fixed effects
and time dummies, and column (5) is a weighted regression using average preexperiment sales as
weights. The term Video indicates that at least one song-specific video was uploaded on the U.S.
YouTube prior to April 1, 2009. The constant is not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the song level. pctl., Percentile.∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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5.4.3 Breadth of Appeal. Our second set of results
concerns heterogeneity across the inherent breadth of
the artist’s appeal. We do this by distinguishing be-
tween niche (narrow appeal) and mainstream (broad
appeal) artists.34 Because any empirical definition
may be arbitrary, we again report results for three
distinct measures (defined in Section 4.4). Results in
Table 12 show that the triple interaction is positive
and significant.
In column (1) of Table 12, the effect for nonniche
artists is −33% (90% CI, [−46%, −16%]), whereas
the effect for niche artists (defined as never having
appeared in the U.S. charts) is −9% (90% CI, [−17%,
−0.04%]). In column (2), the effect for non-German
artists is −23% (90% CI, [−33%, −12%]), whereas for
German-origin artists, we find a nonsignificant de-
crease of 8% (90% CI, [−17%, 3%]). The specification
in column (3) distringuishes between pop/rock and
other genres. The effect for pop/rock songs is −21%
(90% CI, [−30%, −12%]), whereas for all other genres
we find a nonsignificant increase of 1% (90% CI,
[−10%, 12%]).
The 90% confidence bands overlap in the specifi-
cations in columns (1) and (2) of Table 12 and not in
column (3). Hence, we can confirm only that total
sales of artists in niche genres react differently to the
GEMA shock than those of artists in mainstream
genres for the genre-based definition of “niche.”
6. Discussion
In this section, we first discuss how to interpret our
findings in the context of music discovery and spec-
ulate about the underlying mechanisms before we
assess the implications of the heterogeneous effects on
aggregate sales.We then zoomout and provide a back-
of-the-envelope calculation of the overall economic
significance and welfare effects of the blocking policy
in the context of the GEMA shock. Finally, we discuss
the external validity and general implications of our
study in relation to prior literature.
We find that the effect of the removal of online
music videos on song sales is negative. Point esti-
mates vary, but −10% to −5% is a conservative esti-
mate of the short-run effects of removing access to
music videos on sales of recorded music. This sug-
gests that despite the fact that free interactive content
could plausibly substitute for demand for paid con-
tent (as found in most of the piracy literature), free
online music videos tend to complement sales of
recorded music. The extent of UGC does not affect
the positive effect of YouTube availability on music
sales, a result established by directly measuring the
share of UGC and further supported by the entry of
Vevo. Our results further suggest that YouTube can
play an important role in the discovery of music.
Looking at artist subgroups, we find that new artists
benefit more from content availability on YouTube
(and consequently see a bigger drop in sales fol-
lowing the YouTube blackout). Conversely, niche
artists do relatively better following the unavail-
ability of YouTube content.
It is useful to think about these results in terms of
the underlying process of music discovery. Because
music is an experience good, consumers rely on sam-
pling (Peitz and Waelbroeck 2006), word-of-mouth
recommendations (Susarla et al. 2012, Lee et al. 2015),
or automated recommender systems (Liu et al. 2014,
Zhou et al. 2016) for their choice ofwhich newmusical
content to consume. Underlying all of them is the
notion that music discovery incurs search costs, and
each of the three cues for consumers reduces search
costs for new music. Consider now the discovery
Table 11. Heterogeneity: Consumer Awareness
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Two months No album First year
After × Video −0.133∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗ −0.114∗∗
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
After × Newcomer 0.668∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗
(0.385) (0.325) (0.250)
After × Video × Newcomer −0.553 −0.661∗ −0.495∗
(0.430) (0.384) (0.287)
Observations 13,711 13,711 13,711
R2 0.892 0.892 0.892
Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1) Weekly Total Sales in units.
The term Video indicates that at least one song-specific video was
uploaded on the U.S. YouTube prior to April 1, 2009. The term
Newcomer is defined as Two Months in columns (1) and (3), as No
Album in columns (2) and (4), and as First Year in columns (3) and (5).
Song and week fixed effects and the constant are not reported.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the song/artist level.∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Table 12. Heterogeneity: Breadth of Appeal
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Billboard German Genre
After × Video −0.394∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.081) (0.066)
After × Niche −0.310∗∗ −0.213∗∗ −0.061
(0.131) (0.083) (0.079)
After × Video × Niche 0.300∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.249∗∗
(0.146) (0.105) (0.102)
Observations 13,711 13,711 13,711
R2 0.892 0.892 0.892
Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1) Weekly Total Sales in units.
The term Video indicates that at least one song-specific video was
uploaded on the U.S. YouTube prior to April 1, 2009. The term Niche
is defined as Never U.S. in column (1), as German in column (2), Genre
in column (3). Song and week fixed effects and the constant are not
reported. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the song/
artist level.∗p < 0.10; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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process that turns music videos on YouTube into
music purchases. Exposure to free content on You-
Tube leads to higher sales under three conditions.
First, “new” music has to be new to the individual,
because otherwise the individual may have already
purchased it in the past. Second, the newmusic has to
meet the tastes of the listener. Finally, the sampled
content must be a meaningful indicator of the quality
of the song. Because the audio part of music videos
tends to be either identical to or a close adaptation
of what can be purchased in a (digital) record store,
this condition holds in the case of YouTube. Discov-
ery on YouTube may directly transform into digital
purchases via click-to-buy links to retailers such as
iTunes and Amazon (a mechanism that we cannot
test in the absence of individual-level data). Other
times, although there is a causal link between sam-
pling on YouTube and music purchases, this may
work more indirectly without leaving a trail in a con-
sumer’s clickstream.
What do our heterogeneous effects tell us about the
way in which music discovery is affected by You-
Tube? First, the share of UGC plays no role in the
effect of YouTube (un)availability. Conversion rates
are not higher or lower if consumers hear the song
accompanied by an official video compared with
UGC, suggesting that the process of discovery does
not need curated complements to songs. YouTube
creates awareness of an original song (the function
common to official and user-generated versions of the
song), although the delivery channel is not considered
a close substitute to actually purchasing the song.
We also find that new artists benefit relatively
more from YouTube availability, as do mainstream
artists. The former is in line with the awareness
logic—listeners have not been exposed widely to
these new artists, and exposure on YouTube helps
listeners discover them. However, the result that
mainstream artists benefit more than niche artists
from YouTube availability suggests another function
of YouTube: holding everything else fixed, artists in
mainstream genres gain more from YouTube expo-
sure. This suggests that the likelihood of a purchase
after watching a YouTube video is higher for a main-
stream artist because the general appeal of mainstream
artists on YouTube is broader.
Apart from demand-side awareness and mass ap-
peal, what supply-side mechanisms may lead to the
disproportional effects we observe in the data? First,
music videos may be systematically different for new
and mainstream artists. Music videos have become a
widespread complement to audio recordings only in
recent years. This implies that new artists are more
likely to have both more and better music videos than
established artists.35 Similarly, because ofmainstream
artists’ greater expected appeal, the incentives to
invest in video content are bigger, which would lead
to more and perhaps better videos for mainstream
songs. Another mechanism consistent with our het-
erogeneous effects is based on active platform man-
agement. YouTube’s objectives will likely be a mix
of dynamic and static goals. Maximizing views at
any one point in time increases YouTube’s opportu-
nities for monetization in the short run. This speaks
for promoting already popular content with wide
appeal to increase the chances of repeat consumption.
However, consumers need to be exposed to new
content systematically to avoid them losing interest
in the platform. This gives YouTube an incentive to
recommend new artists.36 In sum, both artists and
labels (through better/more engaging video content
for mainstream and new artists) and the platform
itself (through recommender systems) may reinforce
the process of music discovery driven by awareness
and mass appeal of music. These supply-side actions
are, however, complements to demand-side forces
rather than substitutes.
6.1. Online Music Videos and Changes in the
Distribution of Music Sales
Our findings are consistent with the idea that the
process of music discovery is affected by the avail-
ability of YouTube videos by raising potential con-
sumers’ awareness of new music, which especially
benefits artists about whom consumers are initially
relatively unaware and artists who have broad ap-
peal and are therefore more likely to convert video
views into record sales. This is in line with the work of
Lee and Hosanagar (2019), who show that recom-
mender systems in e-commerce tend to put weight on
both extremes of the sales distribution; that is, pop-
ular products become more popular, but long-tail
products increase sales too. The fact that different
types of music benefit to different extents from ex-
posure onYouTube can have implications for the
overall sales distribution. The literature has long
speculated onwhether digital distribution platforms
(and perhaps the recommender systems operating
on them) help the most popular products become
evenmore popular (Celma and Cano 2008, Fleder and
Hosanagar 2009, Zhou et al. 2010, Oestreicher-Singer
and Sundararajan 2012b) or whether they help niche
products with relatively low sales (the long tail)
reach a wider audience (Tucker and Zhang 2011,
Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2012a). Related
work finds evidence that streaming can also change
the distribution of sales (Hiller 2016, Datta et al. 2018).
Using individual-level consumption data from 900 con-
sumers, Datta et al. (2018) show that users switching
from owning (iTunes) to streaming (Spotify) listen
to music from a more diverse set of artists and dis-
cover artists that are new to them. Similarly, the
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displacement effect of streaming in Hiller (2016) is
weaker for less known albums.37
In the specific context of our short-run analysis of
the removal of music videos because of the licensing
dispute between GEMA and YouTube, a back-of-the-
envelope calculation shows that newcomer artists
suffer more than niche artists benefit relative to
mainstream artists. A conservative reading of our re-
sults implies that sales of newcomer artists change by
about δ̂new  −41% and sales of niche-genre artists
change by about δ̂niche  −10% because of the GEMA
shock. To understand the aggregate effect of this, we
need to compare realized market shares with the
counterfactual market shares that would have been
realized had the GEMA shock not happened. We
can estimate the counterfactual sales of newcomers
and mainstream artists by dividing the observed
total sales in the postshock period, that is, T̂∗j  Tj/
(1 + δ̂j), and then calculating their counterfactual mar-
ket shares as m̂∗j  T̂∗j /(T̂∗j + T̂∗−j). Realized market
shares can be calculated accordingly, that is, m̂j  T̂j/
(T̂j + T̂−j). Finally, we can express counterfactual mar-
ket shares as percentages of realized market shares
such that δ̂mj  m̂j/m̂∗j − 1. Average total weekly sales
in the postshock period for newcomers (defined as in
the first year of their career) and niche artists with
music videos are Tnew  24,301 units and Tniche  22,384
units, respectively.With this, we can calculate that the
market share of newcomer artists decreases by 13%,
whereas the market share of niche artists increases by
20%, as a result of the GEMA shock. Using more
conservative estimates, that is, from the respective
confidence bands of other measures of “newcomer”
and “niche,” leads to the same qualitative conclu-
sions. On average, these calculations suggest that
YouTube helps increase the sales of newcomer artists
about two-thirds more than it helps increase the sales
of mainstream artists.
After establishing the distributional changes across
types of artists within the group of songs that have
music videos, we now change the level of aggregation
and investigate distributional changes across songs
with andwithoutmusic videos. So far, a valid concern
would be that the availability of onlinemusic videos is
a zero-sum game, that is, leading to changes in the
composition of music sales without changing ag-
gregate music sales. Furthermore, as in Liebowitz
(2007), a fallacy of composition could lead to effects
in the aggregate that are the opposite of the rela-
tionship on the individual song level.
We first analyze this issue at the song level. From
visual inspection in Figure 2 and the corresponding
figure in the online appendix, we see no indication
that the trend in total sales/streams of songs without
videos (our control group) changes after either the
GEMA shock or the entry of Vevo. Accordingly, our
results do not suggest that online music video plat-
forms have externalities on the sales/streams of songs
not available on these platforms. This is already in-
dicative that the results we document are not merely
driven by a transfer of demand from songs without
videos to songs with videos. By looking at aggregate
sales numbers, we can investigate this further. The
plot of aggregate sales around the GEMA shock in the
first panel of Figure 4 shows that also the aggregate
sales trend of songs without videos does not change
from the pre- to the postshock period. Aggregate sales
of songs with videos, however, decline substantially.
Accordingly, we also see a substantial decrease in
total sales (songs with and without videos). Turning
to aggregate sales in the time frame of the Vevo entry
in the second panel of Figure 4, we see that songs
without videos continue their negative sales trend,
whereas aggregate sales of songs with videos in-
crease. As a result, total record sales do not change by
much. Finally, in the third panel of Figure 4, there
is again no indication that the trend of aggregate
Figure 4. (Color online) Aggregate Effects of Online Music Video Platforms
Notes. In each panel, the vertical axis shows the aggregate of physical and digital sales in thousands of units. The horizontal axis shows weeks
before and after the GEMA shock/Vevo entry. Dots indicate weekly aggregates, and lines indicate averages in the before and after periods.
Aggregate sales of songs without music videos are shown in black. Aggregate sales of songs with music videos are shown in blue. Aggregate
sales of all songs, with and without music videos, are shown in red.
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streams of songs without videos changes with the
entry of Vevo, especially if week t−1 is considered
as an outlier. We do see, however, that aggregate
streams of songs with videos increase. This leads to
an increase in total streams (songs with and with-
out videos).
Combining the insights from the disaggregated
and aggregated analyses, we conclude that the exper-
iments we study in this paper affect the composition
of not only sales/streams but also aggregated sales/
streams. However, note that the analysis of aggre-
gated sales is of course less rigorous than the analysis
using disaggregated data because the plots in Figure 4
are ultimately based on only eight data points.
6.2. Economic Significance and Welfare
Because it is difficult to attach amonetary value on the
utility of free music consumption, it is difficult to
derive an estimate of consumer surplus and there-
fore draw conclusions about overall welfare effects.
However, we can calculate the average economic size
of our estimates and derive estimates of total industry
and artist surplus.
According to our price data, the average price for
a song on a physical medium was €4.4 and that for
a digital song was €1.1 after the GEMA shock. Mul-
tiplied by average total weekly sales units of songs
with videos in the postshock period, this implies
average total weekly revenues of about €360,000.
With the most conservative estimate of a 6% reduc-
tion, this is 94% of the counterfactual revenues that
would have been realized had the GEMA shock not
happened. The monetary equivalent of 6% less sales
than in the counterfactual world is thus about
€23,000. Using the information that artists earn about
10 cents from a downloaded song and 13% of the
physical revenue, we arrive at an estimate of a weekly
decrease of about €2,500 in total artist income from
record sales.38
It is difficult to say much about the loss in royalty
income to artists because we do not have access to
song-level data on the number of streams on YouTube
prior to the GEMA shock. However, we do have data
on the number of streams on services such as Spotify
and Deezer for 2013. Hence, we can roughly calculate
how the entry of Vevo has affected the surplus of the
recorded music industry and the surplus of artists.
Before launching in October 2013, Vevo signed a li-
censing deal with GEMA (see Cookson 2013). Hence,
artists benefit from an increase in record sales and
receive royalties collected by GEMA from Vevo.
Using our data on the average weekly sales and
prices in Germany after the Vevo entry, the most
conservative estimate of a 2% increase in total re-
cord sales translates to an increase in total income
of about €4,500 and an increase in total artist income
from record sales of about €450. According to GEMA’s
official royalty rates schedule for ad-funded stream-
ing offerings (VR-OD-9, see GEMA 2019), the li-
censing fee for a highly interactive service such as
Vevo is €0.00375 per stream. We do not have exact
data on the number of streams on Vevo, but data from
the United States can be helpful as an approximation.
In 2013, there were 49.5 billion music streams, 22.4
billion (45%) from audio services and 27.1 billion
(55%) from video services (see Ingham 2015). Our
data on the average number of weekly (free and paid)
audio streams in Germany do not include video
streaming. Assuming that the ratio in the United
States is the same in Germany, we can then calculate
the hypothetical total royalties from video stream-
ing as (0.55/0.45)× audio× 0.00375. The total number
of audio streams of songs with Vevo videos in the
postshock period is 7,894,000. This implies an increase
in video streaming royalties worth roughly €730. We
do not have data on Vevo’s market share in the music
video streaming market in Germany, but industry
reports suggest that Vevo has had a market share of
2.8% in the overall online videomarket in 2016, which
we can use as a conservative estimate.39We thus arrive
at a lower bound of the averageweekly increase in video
streaming royalties of about €300. The average weekly
increase in audio streaming royalties is about €245.
Our estimate of the total increase in artist surplus is
therefore some €700 perweek. However, this includes
only artists who are represented by Vevo (~70% of
the market).
Now we can calculate the total lost artist surplus
from the unavailability of online music videos—the
sum of lower record sales and foregone royalty income
from video streaming. Assuming that the number of
video streams is stable over time, foregone royalties of
all artists amount to about €400 per week. This implies
that the promotional externalities of online music
video (€2,500 total artist surplus) can offset forgone
royalty income by a factor of six. In the 235 weeks
between theGEMAblocking andVevo entry, ourmost
conservative estimate is a total loss in artist welfare of
about €0.6 million and a loss in industry revenues of
€5.4 million. Note that both numbers do not include
potential advertising revenues from YouTube.
6.3. External Validity and Contribution
6.3.1. Prior Work on the Effect of YouTube on Recorded
Music Sales. At face value, our baseline result seems
in direct contrast to that of Hiller (2016), who con-
cludes that a royalty dispute that led to the takedown
of Warner Music content on YouTube is related to
an increase in sales of albums released by Warner.
However, a careful analysis of the differences and
commonalities in the two studies reveals that some of
Hiller’s (2016) results are line with our findings.
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We first discuss key differences between Hiller’s
(2016) approach and ours and test some of the result-
ing empirical implications. We then try to replicate
Hiller’s (2016) approach as closely as possible in our
setting and discuss alternative interpretations of
Hiller’s (2016) results and how they resonate with
our findings.
Hiller’s (2016) sample comprises the 200 best-selling
albums in the U.S. market. He does not link sales
and corresponding video availability at the individual
song level but compares album sales of Warner artists
with album sales of non-Warner artists. The distinction
between songs and albums can have important im-
plications. Because albums are bundles consisting of
individual songs, YouTube availability, by allowing
consumers to sample, may lead consumers to sub-
stitute purchases of the entire album in favor of
purchases of an individual song that is promoted by a
music video. In the absence of the sampling mecha-
nism on YouTube, sales of other songs that are not
promoted by a music video (or the entire album
bundle) could therefore increase. We can at least
partly test this hypothesis.
In column (1) of Table 13, we investigate how the
removal of video(s) for a specific song affects sales of
other songs (that do not have videos) on the same
release. Releases with multiple songs are typically
extended singles, minialbums (EPs), and, in the digital
channel also, entire albums. We find a positive and
significant coefficient.40 The point estimate is 22%
(90%CI, [7%, 38%]). Hence, this suggests that Hiller’s
(2016) results can be driven by unbundling and sub-
stitutive effects within releases.
In columns (2)–(4) of Table 13, we test whether we
can replicateHiller’s (2016) results whenwe aggregate
sales at the release level. Although this is not the same
as actual album sales—especially not in the physical
channel—it can serve as a proxy for album sales. The
first identification strategy is to compare releases
that have at least one song with a video on YouTube
with those that do not. The effect in column (2) is
−16% (90% CI, [−26%, −4%]), which is similar to our
baseline effect. This implies that in our setting, the
song-level substitution effects that we find in column
(1) are not strong enough to outweigh the release-
level promotional effects of music videos.41. In col-
umn (3), we follow Hiller (2016) and restrict our
sample to the sum of sales within a release while
songs are in the top 200 list. This decreases precision
of the estimates, leading to an effect of −12% that is
not significant (90% CI, [−39%, 24%]).
Finally, we adjust the identification strategy to bet-
ter align with Hiller (2016). The equivalent to Hiller’s
(2016) approach of comparing sales of Warner art-
ists with sales of non-Warner artists in our setting is
to compare sales in Germany with sales in a com-
parable country, say, Austria. The caveat is that we
can run this analysis only for sales in the physical
channel because sales data for the digital channel are
not available for Austria. In column (4) of Table 13,
we find a negative yet imprecisely estimated coeffi-
cient forAfter × Germany, with a point estimate of−2%
(90% CI, [−6%, 1%]). Much as in Section 5.2.2, the less
precise identification strategy leads to smaller point
estimates, but the sign of the effect remains. Finally,
our closest replication of Hiller’s (2016) approach, in
column (5) of of Table 13, considers only the sum of
sales within a release while songs are in the top 200
list. We find a positive coefficient for After × Germany
that implies an effect of 31% (90% CI, [−0.2%, 73%]).
Table 13. Aggregate (Release-Level) Effects of the GEMA Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable OtherSongs Release ReleaseTop Release ReleaseTop
After × OtherVideo 0.197∗∗
(0.077)




After × Germany −0.024 0.272
(0.021) (0.166)
Observations 9,919 6,841 1,180 25,102 2,259
R2 0.902 0.894 0.939 0.031 0.282
Notes. The dependent variable is (log + 1) Weekly Total Sales in units, 2009. Column (1) uses physical and digital sales of individual songs.
Column (2) uses physical and digital sales of the release bundle. Column (3) uses physical and digital sales of the release bundle only when
songs are part of the top 200 list. Column (4) uses physical sales of the release bundle. Column (5) uses physical sales of the release bundle
only when songs are part of the top 200 list. The variable AtLeastOneVideo (OtherVideo) indicates at least one (other) song on the same release
has a video on the U.S. YouTube uploaded prior to April 1, 2009. Song and week fixed effects are used in column (1), release and week fixed
effects are used in columns (2)–(4), and the constant is not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the song level.∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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This is very similar to the effect reported in column (1)
of table 4 in Hiller (2016). The stark disparity between
the results in columns (4) and (5) suggests that the
empirical approach of Hiller (2016), a combination
of sample restrictions and measurement error in
the definition of treatment and control group, may
be responsible for the displacement effect that he
finds. Furthermore, it seems likely that Hiller’s (2016)
finding is mainly driven by the most popular albums.
Indeed, this can be seen directly by looking more
closely at Hiller’s (2016) results. He shows that al-
bums that have a very successful debut face more
displacement from YouTube videos, whereas the
effect on lower debuting albums may be moderated
by a promotional effect. In fact, the estimated inter-
action effect is so strong that the relationship is re-
versed, and the promotional effect dominates for
many albums in the sample. The results in table 5 in
Hiller (2016) suggest that Debutrank moderates the
average effect such that the sign changeswithDebutrank
greater than values between 15.64 and 44.41 (depending
on the specification, x  −βWarnereffect/βWarnerdebutrank),
which is much lower than the average Debutrank of
Warner albums in his sample (79.4). A valid alter-
native interpretation of Hiller’s (2016) results, there-
fore, is that most albums’ sales benefit from the added
awareness generated through YouTube, and only the
most popular albums (those with very small debut
ranks) experience net displacement rather than pro-
motion. As we have shown in Section 5.4, we do not
find heterogeneity across the overall sales distribu-
tion (as Hiller (2016) does), but we do find that the
promotional effect is driven by new artists and by artists
in nonniche genres (which tend to rank slightly better,
that is, are more popular, when they enter the top 1,000).
All this leads us to conclude that the differences
between our results and Hiller’s (2016) findings are
largely due to the of level of aggregation, sample
restrictions, and the choice of identification strategy.
Hiller (2016) provides a partial view on the phe-
nomenon at hand, whereas our analysis covers a
broader range of the popular appeal of music content
through the deeper analysis afforded by our broader
and more detailed data and our more fine-grained
identification strategy. Our findings show impor-
tant heterogeneity, suggesting that the average effect
hides sizable differences in the strength of one of the
counteracting forces, the role of YouTube availability
on music discovery. Thus, we offer a more detailed
unpacking of the process of music discovery than
Hiller (2016). This lets us draw more comprehensive
policy implications.
6.3.2. Policy Implications. Althoughour study is clearly
limited in its scope, being a short-run measurement
exercise that makes use of natural experiments that
happened in specific contexts, it can still be useful to
think about the policy implications that arise from our
results. First, the policy of some countries to mandate a
share of broadcast music to be local (or in the local
language) may be affected by the role of interactive and
global platforms such as YouTube. Second, U.S. copy-
right law currently stipulates licensing fees for interac-
tive digital platforms but none for radio broadcasting
based on assumptions about the degree of substitution
between (free)digital andpaid content (Liebowitz 2007,
Lenard andWhite 2015). Finally, from the perspective
of the German right holders’ association, the differ-
ential effects on domestic versus international artists
may imply that it was acting to maximize their direct
stakeholders’ revenues. We elaborate on each of these
domains next.
Several countries (e.g., France and Portugal) con-
sider local music a cultural good in danger of being
overrun and eventually replaced by international,
often English-language content. This has led to quasi-
protectionist policies stipulating a minimum per-
centage (often 40% or 50%) of local content on radio
and television broadcasts (Hervas-Drane and Noam
2017). Our results suggest that although YouTube
does not displace music sales (which would provide a
direct, unregulated channel for international music to
enter the local market), music discovery via YouTube
favors mainstream (non-German in our case) artists
substantially more than local ones.42 This implies that
policies to protect local (national) creative music in-
dustries are less effective in the presence of digital
platforms for music discovery.
In theUnited States, the rules of compulsory licensing
imply that the music industry receives licensing fees
from interactive digital platforms, whereas radio
broadcasts are traditionally exempt from licensing. It
is interesting to consider the historical reasoning
behind the exemption: radio is a unidirectional me-
dium on which users cannot choose particular songs,
and it was heavily influenced by the music industry,
which offered payment or other inducements to radio
stations to play particular songs (Coase 1979). The
perception was that radio acted as a promotional
channel for actual purchases, relieving broadcasters
of the need to compensate artists for playing their
music because the compensation would come in the
form of higher sales.43 Conversely, digital platforms
are on-demand and users can (at least to some extent)
choose the songs theywant to hear, which in principle
allows for more substitution. Our findings suggest
that digital platforms also fulfill an important pro-
motional function, at least for some types of music.
If replicated in other settings, such evidence might
justify extending the license fee exemption to plays on
digital platforms, and for firms, this result offers a
case for differential online royalties, with new music
Kretschmer and Peukert: Online Music Videos and Recorded Music Sales
Information Systems Research, 2020, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 776–800, © 2020 The Author(s) 795
especially prone to benefiting from exposure on digi-
tal platforms.
Finally, it is also worth revisiting the outcome for
one of the instigators of the initial dispute, GEMA.
GEMA’s members are (virtually all) German artists,
with international artists associated only by virtue of
their membership in other national rights holders’
associations. Our findings show that German artists
suffered relatively less from the YouTube blackout
and gained market share as a result.44 Therefore, the
removal of videos on YouTube may have (deliber-
ately or not) resulted in the main constituency of
GEMA increasing its market position vis-à-vis its
international competitors.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we exploit two natural experiments in
the German market for online music videos to iden-
tify the effect of free sampling on sales of recorded
music. The first experiment lets us identify the effect
of removing access to online music videos on You-
Tube (in April 2009), whereas in the second, we
identify the effect of making official music videos
available on the proprietary platform Vevo (in Oc-
tober 2013). Our analysis is based on a rich data set
that combines sales data that cover a large fraction of
all music sales with song-level information on music
video availability.
We find robust evidence that online videos are
complementary to record sales. We believe that our
findings carry some important general implications.
Three results especially suggest to us that the pro-
motional effect we robustly identify is not driven by
the fact that YouTube is an open platform but rather
by the fact that YouTube offers differentiated content—
music video rather than music. First, we show that
YouTube’s effect on music sales is driven not only by
the availability of official music videos but also by
UGC on YouTube. Second, our results are very simi-
lar when we look at the entry of the closed platform
Vevo. Third, we show that the promotional effect
prevails when we look at the number of plays on
audio streaming platforms, which should be a very
close substitute for music video streaming.
Although we do not find the effect to differ based
on overall popularity in terms of sales, we show that
sales dynamics of newcomer artists are affected
much more by the (non)availability of online music
videos than those of established artists. We also find
that YouTube disproportionally favors music genres
with greater mass appeal. We discuss several pos-
sible mechanisms consistent with the observed dy-
namics on the demand side and on the supply side. In
contrast to the related literature, we study the effect
of online music videos on the sales of songs and
therefore cannot rule out that the effects we show do
not hold regarding bundled sales of songs, for ex-
ample, albums.
In reference to a song by The Buggles—which hap-
pens to be the first music video shown on MTV in
1981—we conclude that our study does not provide
much evidence that “video killed the radio star.”45
If anything, we find the opposite. Whereas it is
straightforward to conclude that free consumption
increases consumer surplus, conclusions about overall
welfare are more difficult to reach. We calculate that
positive externalities of access to an open platform
such as YouTube can offset forgone royalty income
(if YouTube did not pay any royalty fees to artists) by
a factor of six. Furthermore, we show that the distri-
butional effects are substantial. We calculate that
YouTube helps to increase the sales of newcomer
artists by about two-thirds more than it helps to in-
crease the sales of mainstream artists.
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Endnotes
1 See, for example, Hui and Png (2003), Rob and Waldfogel (2006),
Zentner (2006), Rob and Waldfogel (2007), Oberholzer-Gee and
Strumpf (2007), and the survey in Liebowitz (2016), although re-
cent evidence in Peukert et al. (2017) suggests that there is significant
heterogeneity across content types.
2 See O’Brien (2009). More than seven years later, an agreement was
reached; see BBC News (2016).
3 See http://apps.opendatacity.de/gema-vs-youtube/en.
4 See Section 6.3.1 for a discussion of a related paper (Hiller 2016) that
studies the relationship of YouTube and album sales.
5 See Ingham (2016). YouTube’s influence on the music industry
eventually grew so large that Billboard started incorporating YouTube
data into their rankings in February 2013 (see Billboard 2013).
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6The case of Taylor Swift withdrawing her songs from Spotify but
not YouTube is a case in point (see Solon 2016).
7Examples for international counterparts are BMI, ASCAP, and
SESAC in the United States, PRS in the United Kingdom, SACEM in
France, and SGAE in Spain.
8 See Schuetze (2012). In 2009, GEMA had 64,534 members and
distributed €713 million in royalties.
9There is no evidence that YouTube systematically warned content
owners in Germany before blocking videos.
10 Specific legal issues have made it complicated to reach an
agreement between GEMA and YouTube. According to Rolf
Budde, member of the GEMA advisory board, YouTube insists
on a nondisclosure agreement (see https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Hh3Ks4Kxvtk). However, GEMA is required by law to
publish the exact royalty payment schemes. Reportedly, because
of this deadlocked situation, the involved parties consulted the
arbitration board of the German Patent and Trademark Office for
mediation in January 2013, and an agreement was finally reached
in November 2016 (see BBC News 2016).
11After careful research, we could find only anecdotal evidence of one
band opting out of GEMA. Videos on the official YouTube channel of
the successful German rock band Die Ärzte were accessible in
Germany (see Spiegel Online 2012a). It is not clear whether the band
opted out of GEMA. When we asked the band’s management for a
statement, it declined to comment on the issue.
12 See https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bxe11iVXrXgsM0NIQm1
OV1QxSVk.
13 Furthermore, there is no evidence that consumers switched to other
video platforms in the short run.
14 For example, Sven Regener, singer of Element of Crime, says (re-
ferring to YouTube), “a business model based on people who pro-
duce the content not getting any money is not a business model, it’s
crap” (see http://www.br.de/radio/bayern2/sendungen/zuendfunk/
regener_interview100.html). The popular electro/hip-hop band Dei-
chkind posted a raging comment on its Facebook page after finding
out that its newly uploaded music video was being blocked (see
Spiegel Online 2012b).
15Market share data according to Nielsen SoundScan for the United
States (see http://www.statista.com/statistics/317632/market-share
-record-companies-label-ownership-usa/).
16During the observation period, physical record stores drastically
reduced shelf space for singles and focused on physical albums (see
Wallop 2008).
17 See http://www.musikindustrie.de/umsatz/.
18Python code can be found on the authors’ GitHub page: https://
github.com/cpeukert/.
19This query was performed on April 15, 2015. In estimations not
reported here but available on request, we get very similar results if
we use information obtained from the Austrian version of YouTube.
20George and Peukert (2014) define official videos based on whether
the video title includes the word “official,” whereas our definition is
more accurate in that it is based on the account that uploaded the
video. See below for details.
21 Furthermore, in an analysis available on request, we show that
songs with videos tend to be newer than songs without videos, songs
with more recent videos tend to have higher sales, and newer songs
(that are as old as YouTube itself, which started in April 2015, or
newer) more or less immediately have videos, whereas older songs
show no clear pattern.
22According to what Tina Funk, general manager for Germany at
Vevo, told us, this mostly holds true, but Vevo Germany also has
some exclusive content, especially in the first weeks of its launch.
23All 247 artists listed under Vevo’s main YouTube account have
“Vevo” in their YouTube username; see https://www.youtube.com/
user/Vevo/channels?view=56. We also manually checked all artists
in our sample to make sure that we did not miss a Vevo account that
does not follow this convention.
24For the example Niche: Never U.S., P(B|A)  0.821 is the probability
that a song is from niche artist if it does not have a video, P(B)  0.723
is the probability that a song is from a niche artist, and P(A)  1 −
0.548  0.452 is the probability that a song does not have a video.
Using Bayes’ theorem, P(A|B)  (0.821× 0.452)/0.723  0.513 gives the
probability that a song does not have a video if it is from a niche artist.
25 In results available on request, we show that the estimated effect of
the GEMA shock is similar when we do not include fixed effects.
Furthermore, the estimated effect is consistent if we look at sales
ranks, rather than units, as the dependent variable.
26Here, and in what follows below, we calculate percentage effects as
(exp(−0.142) − 1)× 100  −13.24.
27 If artists quickly adjust their digital strategy and drop out of GEMA
or if consumers quickly discover technical measures to circumvent
the blocking (e.g., a virtual private network), we expect a positive
coefficient of After × Video in the second placebo test.
28One may be concerned that the standard errors are large because
the sample size is much smaller than in the baseline specifications of
Table 5. Tomake a fair comparison, we should therefore also estimate
the “true” effect on a smaller sample. In results available on request,
we show that the coefficient of After × Video estimated on a sample
covering a window of ±2 weeks around the true date is −0.133
(standard error, 0.051), with a 90% CI ranging from −0.233 to −0.033.
29 In results available on request, we show that the coefficients remain
similar (qualitatively the same) if we use different thresholds, for
example, the sample mean of 6.4%.
30We choose the cutoff of 200 to be consistent with Hiller (2016). See
the discussion in Section 6.3.1.
31 In the online appendix, we show that the parallel trends as-
sumption also holds for newcomer artists as a subset of the treatment
group.
32Percentage effects are calculated as (exp(−0.133) − 1)× 100  −12.45
and (exp(−0.133 − 0.553) − 1)× 100  −49.64, respectively.
33This is, of course, a reflection of the empirical distribution: the
number of new artists in the music market is almost mechanically
smaller than the number of established artists.
34 In the online appendix, we show that the parallel trends as-
sumption also holds for niche artists as a subset of the treatment
group.
35Note that established artists in our data set include ones that started
their musical careers before MTV and music videos were “invented”
and widely adopted as marketing tools.
36This is highly consistent with the actual goals of YouTube’s video
recommendation system as practiced during our time period, as the
following quote (from a paper by researchers at Google that describes
YouTube’s recommendation algorithm) shows: “We want recom-
mendations to be reasonably recent and fresh, as well as diverse and
relevant to the user’s recent actions” (Davidson et al. 2010, p. 294).
37 See Section 6.3.1 for a detailed discussion of Hiller (2016) in relation
to our findings.
38 See http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/2010/how-much-do
-music-artists-earn-online and Donovan (2013).
39 See https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/209329/umfrage/
fuehrende-videoportale-in-deutschland-nach-nutzeranteil.
40Note that this does not affect the identification strategy in the main
analysis; see the tests in Section 5.1.
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41Note that this reconfirms our findings in Section 6.1 regarding the
fallacy of composition hypothesis.
42The results discussed in Section 5.4.3 imply that removing
videos of non-German artists leads to a significantly lower sales
(point estimate, −23%). The sales effect of removing videos of Ger-
man artists is about three times smaller and not significant (point
estimate, −8%).
43The results in Liebowitz (2007) suggest that the opposite is true. He
shows that radio is more of a substitute for the purchase of sound
recordings than it is a complement.
44We can estimate market share changes in a similar fashion, as
described in Section 6.1. Our results imply that the market share
of non-German artists with videos decreased by 6% (average total
realized sales are 130,898 units), whereas the market share of
German artists with videos increased by 13% (average total re-
alized sales are 72,864 units), as a result the removal of music
videos on YouTube.
45According to music scholar Timothy Warner, the song’s lyrics
are “concerned with the adverse effect of technological change”
(Warner 2003, p. 47) on artists that used to be commercially
successful (in the “Golden Age of Radio,”Warner 2003, p. 44). This
relates to our study, which is essentially an exercise of measuring
the substitutionary or complementary effects of different distri-
bution technologies.
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